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In traditionally Catholic countries, or countries with large and distinct Catholic populations, 
Humanae Vitae (HV) characteristically sparked public discussion, as well as generating heated 
internal Catholic debate (typically between conservative and liberal wings) over the morality or 
otherwise of Pope Paul VI’s notorious encyclical on the regulation of birth.  In European 
countries ruled by one-party Communist regimes, 1 where the Church was monitored and 
infiltrated and public dialogue was constrained, uncovering and evaluating responses to the new 
Vatican directives on birth control is especially complicated.2 In the Hungarian People’s 
Republic, where the regime was embarking on a relatively liberal phase under Kádár, a semi-
independent Catholic church was able to discuss and consider the implications of the papal 
encyclical and to seek a modus vivendi with the Communist Party.3 In the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic, where the Prague Spring was just entering the crisis phase that climaxed in the Warsaw 
Pact invasion on 21 August 1968, the initial response of the Communist-controlled press to the 
publication of HV was silence.4 Although some minimal reporting and muted discussion did 
follow, it was not until the next thaw, and the passing of the 1986 abortion law, that there was 
any clear church reaction in Czechoslovakia.5 The Hungarian and Czechoslovak cases therefore 
illuminate some of the methodological and historiographical, as well as theological and 
institutional, problems in seeking to bring the ‘other’ Europe into our understanding of European 
Catholic responses to HV and the connections between faith, sexual ethics and politics in the lives 
of Catholics under State Socialism .6 
This chapter will begin by presenting the historical background to Church-State relations, 
first in Hungary and then in Czechoslovakia.  It will also introduce the reader to each state’s 
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population policies, birth control and reactions to HV.  The specific cases surrounding Szabolcs 
Vígh in Hungary and the 1968 political crisis in Czechoslovakia will be used to explore some of 
the complications of Church-State relations in Communist and Warsaw Pact states at the time of 
HV. Czechoslovak and Hungarian official Communist Party and Catholic newspapers, among 
other sources, will be gleaned for public responses to the new encyclical. The chapter will 
conclude by highlighting points of similarity and difference in public Catholic responses to HV 
between two neighbouring countries that were at once historically Catholic and officially 
Communist, at a time when it was not straightforwardpossible to canvass private 
opinionsresponses. 
 
The Catholic church in Socialist Hungary 
There are various tropes used to tell the story of the Catholic church under Socialist Hungary. In 
one version, as promoted for example by Ferenc Tomka, a priest and sociologist, this period was 
characterised by a long bout of persecution and suffering with the church holding out heroically.7 
What is emphasized in this narrative is that initially the Stalinist regime confiscated Catholic 
property, demolished churches, dissolved religious orders and imprisoned Cardinal Mindszenty, 
leader of the episcopal hierarchy of the Hungarian catholic church. With the transition to the 
Kádár régime, there continued a story of a continuation of persecution, but with more refined 
methods, and various examples of resistance are shown in which many Catholics remained 
uncompromising  enemies of the regime, and even those, who cooperated with the regime did so 
under momentous duress and with a clear (and sole) intention of saving the Church.8Other 
narratives focus on the collaboration between leading church authorities like Cardinal László 
Lékai, who was head of the Church between 1976 and 1986, and demand the opening of the 
secret service files to reveal the extent to which the clergy were involved as secret agents. 9 There 
have been demands for a thorough Vergangeheitsbewaeltigung (coping with the past) in the 
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church, especially after 2005 when the historian Tamás Majsai revealed in the weekly Magyar 
Narancs a list of named agents who were members of various Christian churches.10  
However, amidst the in-fights which invariably centre on ‘who was’ or ‘how many were 
on the lists’ and whether the individual was a perpetrator or merely ‘an agent-but-victim’, one 
issue has remained on the margins: the effect of socialism on Catholic theology. Máté Gárdonyi, 
one of the pre-eminent scholars of the history of the twentieth-century Catholic church in 
Hungary, has recently published a study in which he claimed that, as of the mid-1960s in the 
wake of the Second Vatican Council, it is possible to delineate a struggle to produce an 
indigenous, tailored theology that remained both genuinely Catholic yet took into account the 
realities of the situation of the church in Socialist Hungary.11 This theology had its foreign 
influences, including first and foremost the German Jesuit Karl Rahner, but there was also a 
distinct ‘Hungarian theology’, which could be linked to people like Ferenc Gál, Tamás Nyíri or 
András Szennay.12 Rahner’s popularity in Hungary is partly attributed to his personal connections 
to Hungarian theologians, - especially Rahner’s former student from Vienna, Tamás Nyíri13 - 
who were anyway keen on following new ideas in German language theology. Nyíri in a 1972 
tribute to Rahner emphasized, among others, the role of the ‘“free person’“ and this person‘s 
freedom to decide about himself,14, along with Rahner’s stress on historicity and change, stating 
that the Church itself is not ‘“a house that has been built up and fully furnished for good’.“15 
One factor that enabled these developments was the changed political strategy following 
the 1956 revolution, resulting in the Hungarian Socialist regime adoption of a ‘popular front’ 
politics, repudiating purges and class warfare and seeking to integrate former enemies – including 
Christians – into a cohesive Socialist society. In testimony to this reorientated approach, in 1964 
the Vatican signed an agreement with Hungary which normalized relations and gave way to 
interpretations that were based on the peaceful coexistence of Marxists and Christians.16 Another 
factor generated within the chuch itself was Second Vatican Council, which encouraged dialogue 
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with social forces outside the church and gave permission for inculturated interpretations of 
general theological premises.17 
 Gárdonyi contends that there was therefore no conservative-progressive stand-off within 
the Catholic church in Hungary after the Council, unlike so many of the other countries surveyed 
in this volume, and that a policy of moderation prevailed with a ‘centrist’ theology that did not 
attempt radical modernization, but proposed careful reforms if there was too marked a divergence 
between the modern world and Catholic values. The three theologians from the Pázmány Péter 
Theology Academy (Nyír, Gál, Szennay) were key in spreading and cultivating this centrist 
theology both as professors and as authors and editors of key periodicals.  Interestingly, as 
becomes clear from the archives of the State Church Affairs Office – the Communist umbrella 
organization that had a controlling function over all churches – these state officials were in favour 
of what they called the ‘Gál-Szennay’ line because it was feared that, should the progressives 
take control, there would be an undesired revival of church life.18 
 
Humanae Vitae, contraception and Hungarian Catholics 
The ‘centrist’ theology in Catholicism, just described, is important for understanding the 
Hungarian reception of HV and Catholic views on contraception. One of its leading proponents, 
Szennay, was not just a theologian but founder and editor of the influential Catholic periodical 
Teológia as of 1971 and a leading church dignitary, the Head Abbott of Pannonhalma after 1972.  
Thus, in the 1970s Szennay had an outreach to both the church leadership and to a wider range of 
Catholic intellectuals, who read his books and his periodical.19 Also, the periodical Vigília was 
significant for Catholic thinking at the time. It was a monthly paper that dealt with contemporary 
issues, culture, literature and was one of the few Catholic voices that was not banned and could 
uphold a certain level of independence. At the time the writer and poet György Rónay was chief 
editor (between 1969 - 1978) with journalist and translator Károly Doromby, the influential 
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literary editor of Vigília supported a group of ‘polgári’ (bourgeois-bürgerliche) writers and poets, 
who were otherwise silenced in publishing their poems and short stories, through which Vigília 
acquired a name beyond Catholics, for its literary quality.20 Vigília, founded in 1935, was a 
progressive voice of Catholicism even before the Second World War, when it gave a voice to the 
literati who were in opposition to the right-wing authoritarian political system.21  
Rónay and Doromby, inspired by the Second Vatican Council and the Vatican's Ostpolitik, 
themselves sought a dialogue with Marxists in the 1970s and were ready to open up discussion on 
issues such as the family and sexuality. In March 1972, the entire issue of Vigília was dedicated 
to the topic of ‘sexuality, family, society,’ in which some articles reflected more progressive 
views on sexuality22. The editors' introduction to the issue reveals a great deal about the 
underlying philosophy of their endeavour: 
If we need to observe this in the whole system of personal-social contexts, then we 
have to observe it 'here and now', in the reality of the big and deep Hungarian 
demographic problem, seeing and sensing both the personal questions of family 
planning and the national question of fertility […]. How this does not go against the 
objectives, intentions and the discussions and examinations that have arisen around 
the official church statement [Humanae Vitae] – this does not need to be explained, 
either to those, who look for orientation in an adult and responsible way, based on the 
objective knowledge of facts and not mis-explanations, fake news, sometimes even 
slander or damaging passions that dim the facts.23. [ref – volume number, page no] 
The editors later commented that in the periodical they regularly attempted at bringing in Marxist 
voices. In this instance, it was the Head of the Sociology department of ELTE University, Tibor 
Huszár, who, by contributing to the volume,with an interview discussion gave the impression of 
the Marxist-Catholic dialogue extending as far as family and sexuality.   but the emerging 
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sexologist and later sexual radical Vilmos Szilágyi also published in Vigília in 1974.24 With 
regard to sexuality, as the people behind Vigília supported views that were more acceptable to 
the Marxist mainstream, the threat of censorship was less direct and the effort to bring in experts 
on the family and sex – irrespective of their political/religious convictions – seems genuine. 
In respect to its stance on HV, the periodical had been fairly consistent in taking the side 
of the internal church critics (and the Majority Report) who promoted a more permissive view on 
contraception. Vigília published the whole text of the encyclical in November 1968 and then, 
after some silence, in June 1969 it published an extended summary (with lengthy quotes)  of Dr 
Karl Hörmann's ‘Humanae Vitae and Pastoral Care’ which had appeared in the Wiener 
Kirchenzeitung and was sanctioned by the Austrian Bishop's Conference. Hörmann held that it 
was sinful not to have children just for love of comfort and fear of sacrifice,25[rf page in journal] 
but permissible if in conformity with the principle of self-love and love for one's neighbour.26[ref 
– Doesn’t “Ibid” work here?] If spouses were forced to make an ‘urgent decision’, they would be 
allowed to choose a path that they believed harmed love the least.27 
In October 1969 Doromby gave a comprehensive overview in his article ‘One year after 
Humanae Vitae’, taking similar precautionary measures. He abstained from taking a clear stance 
and settled for giving extensive summaries of opinions from Catholics around the world. As the 
bulk of these were critical of the encyclical, it was not necessary to actually quote any Hungarian 
church dignitary or theologian in order to give an idea of what the editors of Vigília thought 
about Humanae Vitae.28  
Doromby focused on the reactions from within the universal church, emphasizing that this was a 
theological question about which the opinion of journalists or other lay commentators was less 
important. He mentioned that the criticisms had mostly been directed at the Pope for taking up 
the minority position on contraception, i.e. endorsing the Knaus-Onigo Ogino method as the only 
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method that kept the act of marriage open to conception.29  If in theory family planning was 
permissible morally, he quoted the critics, it was hard to find a convincing argument to separate 
‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ methods.30 He then gave a long summary (around 1,300 words) of the 
bishops’ councils of Austria, Belgium, Canada and Germany (critical) and a short one (less than 
200 words) of the bishops of Italy and the United States (supportive).31Over three subsequent 
pages discussed criticism of the concept of ‘nature’ employed in the encyclical, quoting German, 
Swiss and French theologians Alois Müller, Hanno Helbling, Jean-Marie Paupert and three 
medical experts who published their views in Catholic periodicals (G.A. Hauser, Friedrich, H. 
Koester and Friedrich E. Freiherr von Gagern), while the final part of the article discussed the 
question as to whether or not the encyclical would be binding on consciences. The experts 
Doromby quoted tended to emphasize that this encyclical was not deemed infallible and 
therefore Catholics had a right to question it and even to assume that it was ‘fallible’. The 
commentary piece ended with a long quote from the renowned Christian socialist thinker, 
German catholic theologian and journalist Walter Dirks’s article in Frankfurter Hefte, stating 
that those Catholics who follow their conscience in family planning instead of obeying the HV 
need not leave the church, because ‘if the pope does not understand them they can still 
understand the pope as it is not easy to get rid of a system of values that has developed in the 
quarantined experience of a group that has lived in celibacy for hundreds of years’.32 
In the January 1970 issue of Vigília, Béla Udvarhelyi, a Catholic priest, initiated a 
controversy  in print claiming that Doromby gave too much space, comparatively, to the critics of 
HV.33 Udvarhelyi questioned the legitimacy of bishops, theologians and, ultimately, married 
people following their own consciences instead of the papal directive and complained that the 
Pope was depicted as anachronistic, standing in the way of a transition from the male celibate-led 
church to a modern church. He referred to the Second Vatican Council (Lumen Gentium §25 and 
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Dignitas Humanae §14.) to suggest that even the non ex cathedra statements of the Pope should 
be followed both in will and in mind.34[Again, „Ibid“? Referring to the previous footnote ref]  He 
saw the real crisis of the church in all the wasted energy that came from misunderstanding and 
misapplication of theological pluralism, freedom of research and of conscience: ‘if negative 
critical activity becomes overbearing in any branch of theology, then such theological strands 
might dissolve the faith and loyalty to the church in many’.35 
Udvarhelyi's notes triggered two reactions: firstly, Doromby formulated a more straightforward 
opinion of his own, and secondly, he asked the leading theologian, András Szennay for 
assistance. In other words, the indignation of a rank-and-file priest helped the cautious, centrist 
Hungarian theology of the time to ‘come out’ on contraception and HV.   
In his brief reply Doromby acknowledged that critical voices towards the HV received a 
disproportionate attention in his report. He put forth that most critics pointed out one fundamental 
contradiction: contraception itself was deemed morally acceptable, but in turn, technologies that 
were considered ‘“morally neutral’“  - as they did not fundamentally differ from other medical 
interventions like taking pills or undergoing plastic surgery – rendered it immoral, according to 
the HV. Dormby claimed that he was ‘“unable to find among the statements supportive of the HV 
attempting to properly addressing this crucial isse from a scientific point of view’“ and this is 
why one side received more attention. 36  
András Szennay‘s ‘The theologian's opinion’ provided a thorough analysis of the HV and 
contraception.37  He put forward the notion that ‘“there has not yet  been a papal encyclical that 
would receive such passionate and sensitive reactions’“38 as the HV 
; and added that HV did not cite the bible and was acknowledged as not an ‘infallible’ 
statement. The key message of his argument – partly drawing on the Second Vatican Council’s 
principle of the primacy of conscience -   was that even though one needed to stay loyal to papal 
decrees, if there was an internal conflict ‘each individual, after having weighed all arguments 
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most consciously, has to follow their own internal conscience. This is their obligation even if this 
conviction would differ from the pope's message.’39 According to Szennay, the controversy 
ensued partly because a 4/5 majority of the Pontifical Commission had a dissenting opinion and 
because ‘the faithful people of God – knowing the weight of the question from the practice of life 
– mostly had a different opinion, and according to surveys, followed a different practice with 
regard to birth control’.40 He referred to a 1964 speech by Cardinal Albert Gregory Meyer, the 
liberal-minded prelate of the USA and senior delegate at the Second Vatican Council. in which 
he claimed that not all tradition within the church is legitimate apostolic tradition, there can be 
dead ends, like moralism and therefore church tradition needed to be observed critically.41 Also, 
he returned to the issue of fallibility, going back to idea that the bible did not make claims about 
certain ‘marital ethics and biological’ questions and therefore, in the here and now, one did not 
have the right (or the need) to make such an adjudication [judgement? Adjustment?].42 Szennay 
also posed a rhetorical question concerning transparency and participation:  
three years after a council that promoted internal and external dialogue of the Church, 
for such a difficult question, shouldn't they have involved to a much larger extent 
Christian married people, who in the end bear the burden of the heat of the day?43  
In conclusion, he claimed that the calling of the theologian was to ‘serve and help the 
suffering, praying, contemplating pope, just as he serves and helps all other members of the 
faithful people of God’.44 In other words, in Szennay's interpretation, the Pope had shown himself 
to be a fallible human being who had made a mistake in following the opinion of the conservative 
minority probably to save face for the Vatican, and that it was the right and the duty of a 
‘progressive’ theology to correct this mistake in practice. 
 Szennay was the editor and founder of the other Catholic periodical, Teológia and, 
predictably, HV received a similar reception there. An anonymous article in the 1968/2 issue (the 
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only authorless one in that issue), entitled ‘Marriage yesterday and today’, appeared before the 
encyclical was issued.45. Just as with Doromby’s first piece in Vigília, this article, in addition to 
being unattributed, was mostly a compilation of foreign theologians’ ideas. It cited Fr. von 
Gagern’s book (Das neue Gesicht der Ehe) from 1966, indicating that 'the ‘burden’ of individual 
choice and responsibility has increased', as well as Georg Teichtweier, the chair of the Theology 
Faculty in Würzburg, Germany, who claimed that there was not always a recipe for new 
questions and that for new answers, Catholics needed to turn to experts (doctors, biologists, 
sociologists, etc.) for assistance. In addition to experts, the author pointed out, Christian married 
couples also needed to be consulted about contraception, since ‘God’s people means the whole of 
the people’ and therefore not just the experts but also the people most affected.46  Both Denis 
O’Callaghan and Bernhard Haering were cited for their emphasis on love as the most important 
aspect of marriage, the first claiming that children have to be a result of responsible parental 
decisions and not tragic ‘coincidences’47 and the second referring to the pre-eminence of the 
conscience of the married couple in the decision.48  
 In the December issue of Teológia contributors already had a chance (anonymously) to 
comment on HV, which had been issued in the meantime.49 It is mentioned that the encyclical is 
hesitant and that in comparison with Casti Connubii (1930)  it is a ‘pastoral document’ rather 
than a decision that came from above50 which does not want to demonize married couples using 
birth control as persistent sinners. According to this interpretation of HV, the encyclical 
condemns the behaviour of those employing artificial methods, but does not judge the people 
themselves.51  The prohibition should thus only be seen as a ‘“prophet’s message” on marriage 
and love that many misunderstand and endanger.’52 The article ended with a quote from the Jesuit 
theologian Gustave Martelet, which emphasized that the encyclical needed to be taken seriously 
in accordance with one’s conscience, but should always be interpreted according to individual 
circumstances.53  
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Just as in Vigília, a lower rank priest sent an (anonymous) article to Teológia as a way of 
protesting against the leniency of the journal’s approach to the HV. His arguments were 
published but, similarly to the method applied in the other journal, the counter-arguments were 
published in the same issue54.[ref] In Teológia, instead of resorting to the authority of the 
theologian, eight commentators55 were brought in as representative of the ‘“rank and file’” 
church membership. 56   
The dissenting priest’s arguments were quite obviously anachronistic: he cited references 
from the interwar era and made statements that could be refuted without much effort.57 Among 
the arguments related to health, he mentioned that for pneumonic tuberculosis there was an 
indication that sometimes being pregnant has a healing effect and that 'medicine has made it clear 
that a healthy woman, if she lives a sexual life, sometimes needs the modified neurohormonal 
state that comes about due to pregnancy.'58 For 'social reasons' he speculated that the Earth could 
serve around 200 billion people with food and that humans were made to rule and populate the 
earth, so actually there was no danger of overpopulation.59 As for eugenics, he quoted a 1928 
German article which mentioned that the 'willingness of the white races to procreate was very 
low,' adding that even though the social measures of the Hungarian government60  helped avoid 
the worst, the population still needed many more children.61  
The reactions came from a 'village priest-teacher,' a 'father of seven,' a '25 year old university 
student,' a 'theology academy teacher,' a 'young priest,' a‘Budapest priest'and two 'mothers of 
four.' All eight were unequivocally critical of the priest’s opinion, saying among other things, that 
he is 'anachronistic, not a good Christian when he is lecturing others,' and that he 'looks to the 
’20s and ’30s for literature,' and 'does not even try to clear up the related concepts'62 The theology 
academy teacher emphasized that 'Marriage and the female body are not a breeding institution set 
up to give birth', while the mothers stated 'a woman is also a person and not a farm animal or 
slave or object of male consumption.' The father of seven mentioned love ('It is unnatural and 
Formatted: Font: Italic
 12 
unrealistic to want to have all aspects of love focus on creating offspring.') and the Budapest 
priest reminded readers that it was a 'very disputed question if the calendar method was natural at 
all.'63 As this survey illustrates, both major Catholic periodicals published at the time in Hungary 
took up an overall critical position towards HV. Both were linked to a handful of centrist-
progressive theologians, who rarely confronted the – presumably – conservative ecclesia64 
directly but opted rather for quoting Western European and North American theologians 
extensively and publishing anononymous opinions. The above texts can be taken be as 
representative because they mirrored the views of leading theologians, who ran the contemporary 
Catholic press at the time. Catholic publicity was heavily restricted and therefore Catholic 
intellectuals in Hungary, who would have been interested in reading and debating about the 
Humanae Vitae, were informed about it primarily in the pages of Vigília and Teológia.  
 
The troubled history of the Catholic church in Czechoslovakia 
In neighbouring Czechoslovakia, reactions to HV were rather different than those in Hungary. 
The story of Catholicism in Czechoslovakia at around the time of the Second Vatican Council is 
especially complicated for a number of reasons. First of all, in 1968 the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic was in the process of being federalised into distinct Czech and Slovak socialist 
republics. 65 Secondly, there was a long history of Czech anticlericalism that predated 
Communism. This mattered, even in traditionally observant Slovakia, because Czechoslovak 
Communism was built on a traditionally anticlercial Czech nationalist discourse. Finally, the 
Slovak and Czechoslovak Communist Party reforms known collectively as ‘Socialism with a 
Human Face‘ (the ‘Prague Spring’), which coincided with the timing of the Second Vatican 
Council, were thrown into crisis by the Warsaw Pact intervention, and subsequent enunciation of 
what came to be known as the Brezhnev doctrine, in the last third of August 1968, just as 
discussion of the encyclical was at its height around the Catholic world. 
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Czechoslovakia, federated from 1969 until it split completely in 1993, consisted of two 
socialist republics: the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic. Although 
theoretically of equal standing, in practice the two socialist republics were of unequal political 
importance, since all federal powers were held in Prague, which was simultaneously the capital 
of the regional Czech republic and also the national Czechoslovak state. Similarly, the Catholic 
hierarchy in Czechoslovakia was notionally divided into a Czech Catholic hierarchy and a Slovak 
Catholic hierarchy; but state policy towards the Vatican, and indeed towards the domestic 
church(es), was dictated from the central government based in Prague which was 
overwhelmingly Czech (rather than Czech and Slovak) Communist in outlook. This remained the 
case, even under the leadership of Dubček, the rising Slovak Communist star who was promoted 
from leadership of the regional Slovak Communist Party to that of the statewide Czechoslovak 
Communist Party on 1 January 1968.66 
The Czechoslovak state’s relationship to the Catholic Church – with a brief exception 
during the Second Czech-Slovak Republic of 1938-9 – had never been good.  In 1918, the state’s 
founding father, President T.G. Masaryk, a lapsed Catholic and self-conscious visionary and 
progressive, confiscated church property, abolished the aristocracy and restricted religious 
education.67 Drawing on Czech nationalist understandings of the Hussite past, and inspired by 
Henry VIII’s break with Rome, Masaryk sought to replace the Catholic Church in 
Czechoslovakia with the Anglican-style church known as the Czechoslovak Hussite church. 
Masaryk’s watchword ‘Away with Rome!’ was understood in the 1920s not only as a republican, 
anticlerical and Czech political rallying-cry, but also as a practical means to help Czechs and 
Slovaks overcome Austrian and Hungarian ‘imperial’ attitudes as well as peasant 
‘backwardnessbackwardness’ , including some embarrassing superstitions about Jews.68 The 
result was that Czechs, although formally Catholic, tended to identify with positions more usually 
associated with self-consciously progressive Protestants, socialists or atheists. This could be seen 
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in many Czech nationalists’ anticlericalism, notions of scientific, political and social progress, 
theoretical feminism, and relatively liberal attitudes towards marriage, sex and , contraception, 
and even abortion.69 
Church-State tensions, which were acute enough in the 1920s for relations with the 
Vatican to be broken off entirely, were further complicated, from the late 1930s and throughout 
the Second World War, by the rise to power in Slovakia of a clercial-fascist régime – the only 
fascist regime in Europe to be led by a Catholic priest - which was closely allied to Hitler’s 
Germany. This first Slovak Republic, led by the Slovak Populist Party leader Fr Jozef Tiso, took 
an energetic and well-publicized part in the invasion of Poland, the forcible expulsion of Czechs 
from Slovak territory, the removal of Communists and persecution of Jews, before being briefly 
overturned by mainly Communist and Jewish Slovak partisans in 1944 and, savedrestored by 
German military intervention in Spring 1945. Czechoslovakia’s wartime experiences, when the 
post-Munich state was divided into a German Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and a nominally 
independent Slovak Republic, further sharpened pre-existing tensions between self-consciously 
progressive, socialist-minded Bohemian Czechs in the western provinces and self-consciously 
conservative, Christian Slovaks in the east.70 
Patriotic approval of Hussite/proto-Protestant critiques of the Catholic church which were 
energetically fostered during the interwar Czechoslovak state under the leadership of President-
Liberator T.G. Masaryk and his circle of intimate advisors known as the Castle Group (Hrad), 
were taken up with zeal, but subtly transformed, by the postwar Czechoslovak Communist Party 
(Komunistická strana Českoslovanska, hereafter KSČ). The Communist régime, which continued 
to honour Jan Hus, made a particular hero of the one-eyed Hussite warrior Jan Žižka, who was 
simultaneously presented as a Czech patriot, an anticlerical, and a proto-Communist radical 
reformer. The Hussite emphasis on the importance of the use of the Czech vernacular and 
communion in both kinds (as reflected in the Hussite symbol of the chalice) meant that the 
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Second Vatican Council removed some important barriers to Catholicism in Czech nationalist 
thinking.  It thus made the Catholic church potentially more acceptable to Czech nationalists as 
well as to reform Communists.71 As James Felak has recently noted, the democratizing and 
liberalising aims of both the papacy during the Second Vatican Council and the Czecholsovak 
Communist leadership during the Prague Spring gave the two 1960s reform movements, which 
roughly coincided, a good deal in common.72 
Although opinion polls and surveys undertaken by the Communist régime need to be 
treated with caution, the pattern of contrasting attitudes to religion between the Czech and Slovak 
republics, which continues to the present day, emerge clearly from all the available evidence. 
According to a survey conducted by Sociologia between January and March 1970, Slovakia’s 
adult population in 1970 consisted of  70.7% believers, 14% atheists, and 15.2% 
‘uncommitted’.73 In a poll taken in 1968, 71% of Slovaks identified as believers, whereas in 1974 
just 13% of Czechs so identified.74 How many Slovak Catholics took a reform position or liberal 
attitude to HV is impossible to know for certain; but the presumption is that a higher proportion 
of Slovak-speaking than Czech-speaking Catholics in Czechoslovakia were conservative; that 
Czechs from Bohemia were mainly liberal or progressive; and that Czechs from Moravia fell 
somewhere in the middle. 
What this fraught historical background and religious contrast meant politically was that 
an instinctively anticlerical Czech Communist elite, acutely conscious of the degree to which 
Slovak Catholicism, fascism and conservatism had led to Czechoslovakia’s downfall in 1938-9 
and the subsequent rise of an independent clerical Slovak state (1939-1945), was particularly 
determined to curb the Catholic church’s influence, especially in Slovakia, where Catholics 
appeared as a potential Fifth Column of reaction (and won little sympathy from Czech or Slovak 
Communists who had spent the war in domestic as well as foreign concentration and labour 
camps). It was no accident that the Catholic church was generally treated more harshly in 
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Communist Czechoslovakia than elsewhere in the Eastern bloc,75 and that it remained 
problematic for Czech nationalism but continued to be closely tied to Slovak nationalism. 
After the Czechoslovak Communist takeover in February 1948, when the KSČ no longer 
needed to woo the Catholic vote and the Vatican was backing the West in the Cold War, the 
repression of the Catholic church in Czechoslovakia was resumed in earnest. Party propaganda, 
intimidation, arrests and show trials not only presented Catholics as agents of a foreign power, 
but also laid stress on supposed class divisions between the hierarchy (treated as a reactionary 
aristocrats) and ordinary priests or laypeople (treated as only partially misguided proletarians or 
peasants).76 The latter, wherever possible, were co-opted into the position of speaking out as 
‘progressives’, in other words, trained as Marxists prepared to speak out in praise and support of 
any initiative undertaken by the Communist Party or the Communist Party-controlled National 
Front government. In addition to those who may sincerely have believed in dialogue and overlap 
between Marxism and Christianity, others were acutely aware of who paid their salaries and 
guaranteed their security. A certain number were StB (state security or secret police) informers or 
agents, some of whom masqueraded as priests, monks or laymen in order to better monitor, 
influence and denounce.77 In Czechoslovakia, the nadir of Church-State relations came in about 
1950, when a mass show trial of so-called ‘Vatican Agents’ (mainly the leaders of Czech and 
Slovak religious houses) was staged.78 The show trial was preceded and accompanied by a 
virulent anticlerical campaign, including such astonishing features as the staging, by the secret 
police, of a faked miracle to discredit the local parish priest; the routine use of torture (mainly 
sleep deprivation) to force priests to pen written confessions to sabotage, corruption, 
homosexuality or paedophilia; and Operation K, the forced closure of all monasteries and 
convents across the state and the dumping of their former inhabitants into prison camps, 
including the infamous ‘concentration monastery’ at Valdice. 79 The fact that Slovak villagers, 
who had witnessed Jews being rounded up just a few years before, assumed that the monks being 
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loaded onto coaches at gunpoint were being taken away to be gassed, gives some idea of the 
atmosphere.80 
 
Czechoslovak Catholics, population control and Humanae Vitae  
Although the development of population control followed roughly the same path in socialist 
Czechoslovakia as in socialist Hungary, it was not subject to the same levels of public debate 
under the two Communist regimes. The initial response to HV in Czechoslovakia appears to have 
been almost complete silence. Although the régime-approved weekly Czech Catholic newspaper 
Katolické noviny had been routinely publishing ‘Documents from the Second Vatican Council’ 
and was favourably disposed towards the Vatican’s Ostpolitik, the full text of the encyclical was 
not made available to Czechoslovak Catholic readers, either in the original Latin or in Czech or 
Slovak translation.81 In the months that followed the publication of HV, only a handful of articles 
in the Czech and Slovak press – even in the official Catholic press – so much as mentioned the 
encyclical.82 It is possible, indeed likely, that the StB (state security) agent who is known to have 
been present throughout the Second Vatican Council reported to the Ministry of Interior and 
advised on the matter of birth control; but since his entire file has been destroyed and can no 
longer be consulted in the State Security archive in Prague, we can only speculate as to what it 
might have contained.83 Unfortunately, Radio Free Europe Situation Reports, researched and 
written between 1968 and 1972, which were funded by official and unofficial US government 
sources and which include fairly comprehensive press surveys, do not so much as mention HV.84 
The only obvious sources to gauge contemporary Czech and Slovak Catholic reactions to HV are 
therefore to be found in a tiny handful of methodologically problematic newspaper articles which 
addressed the topic directly. 
 
The encyclical and the end of the Prague Spring 
 18 
HV was published on 25 July 1968, just as Soviet, East German and Polish Communist concerns 
about the Czechoslovak Communist Party’s experiments with Prague Spring reforms were 
reaching crisis point. Preparations were already being made for the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact 
intervention that took place on the night of 20-21 August 1968, when the leaders of the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic were arrested and the country invaded from all sides by between 
a quarter and half a million Soviet, Hungarian, East German, Bulgarian and Polish troops.85 
Instead of being shot, the KSČ leaders were brought to the Kremlin for ‘negotiations’. 
These ended, after three days, with the signing, on 26 August 1968, of a document known 
colloquially as ‘the Moscow Protocol’. The Moscow Protocol’s stated aim was to ‘normalise’ the 
political situation in Czechoslovakia as a precondition for the withdrawal of Warsaw Pact troops 
(ostensibly brought in to defend their Socialist ally from Counterrevolution), and the restoration 
of the Czechoslovak Communist leadership to their positions. The KSČ leadership, half-guests 
and half-prisoners in the Kremlin for several days, bowed to Soviet pressure. Nearly all of the 
Prague Spring reforms – with the notable exception of federalization, which went ahead as 
planned at the end of 1968 – were signed away secretly in Moscow and gradually rescinded over 
the course of 1969 and 1970, after the Dubček leadership’s return to Prague. On 1 January1969, 
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSR) became a federation of two Socialist Republics: the 
Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics (ČSSR).86  
Between late 1968 and 1971, the KSČ was throughly purged, with every single Party 
member required to fill in a form and be called for interview (screened) for political reliability. 
Dubček himself was initally allowed to preside over the dismantling of his own Central 
Committee’s reforms; then demoted; and finally expelled from the KSČ.87 It only gradually 
became apparent to the general public that the April 1968 (Prague Spring) reforms were neither 
to be retained nor reinstated. At first, in the initial weeks and months after the Warsaw Pact 
invasion, when Dubček still remained at the helm of the KSČ and the terms of the Moscow 
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Protocol were not known to the public, it seemed possible that a tactical withdrawal of the 
reforms would be followed, in time, by cautious reattempts at milder reforms. As things turned 
out, no such second attempt at liberalization was to be made by the Communist Party in 
Czechoslovakia until at least as late as 1986-1987, when signs of reform began to be sensed from 
Moscow, and arguably not until the KSČ’s own brand of perestroika – known as přestavba – was 
officially adopted in January 1989.88 
 
The Catholic Church, Central Committee and the Prague Spring 
The fortunes of the official Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia during the Communist 
dictatorship were almost entirely bound up with the KSČ Central Committee politics of the day. 
After January 1968, when Alexander Duček was brought in to replace Antonín Novotný as KSČ 
First Secretary, the Catholic church began to benefit from the newly reformist, self-consciously 
‘anti-Stalinist’ atmosphere. According to an anonymous intelligence analyst working for Radio 
Free Europe, this ‘process of rebirth’ affected ‘every aspect of religious life in Czechoslovakia’.89 
On 25 March 1968, the old school director of the Secretariat for Church Affairs, Karel Hrůza, 
was sacked after denying that priests had been jailed for their faith and insisting that ‘freedom of 
religion had been strictly observed in the past’.90 His replacement, Dr Erika Kadlečová, a 
sociologist from the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, was a much more concilatory figure, 
and it was she who directed the astonishingly wide-ranging religious reforms that were to follow. 
The 1968 religious reforms in Czechoslovakia appear, for the most part, to have 
represented the direct, self-conscious reversal of the ‘Stalinist’ legislation of the 1950s. Religious 
orders for men and women, which had been closed by decree in April 1950, were reopened, the 
Prosecutor General’s Office in Prague having declared that since the monasteries and convents 
had not been abolished by a law, but only administrative decree, there was no legal obstacle to 
their reinstatement.91 The Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, which had been forcibly disbanded in 
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1950, was reestablished.92 The Old Catholic church, the small offshoot of the Roman Catholic 
church which broke away in protest after papal infallibility was made dogma at the First Vatican 
Council of 1869-1870, was once again allowed to practise in Czechoslovakia. The Communist-
controlled ‘Peace Movement’ of  collaborationist Catholic clergy, which had been headed by the 
particularly loathsome Josef Plojhar, leader of the Czechoslovak People’s Party and later found to 
be working for the StB, was abolished.93 
On 14 May 1968, a new ‘Work of Council Revival’, headed by the Prague ‘administrator-
bishop’ František Tomášek, was established at the Velehrad Congress, evidently as a replacement 
for the detested ‘Peace priests’.94 Formerly imprisoned bishops in ordinary returned to their 
dioceses: Karel Skoupý to Brno in Moravia; Josef Slouch to České Budejovice in Bohemia; 
Štěpan Trochta to Litoměřice in the former Sudetenland; Kajetán Matoušek to Prague.95 
Hundreds of priests were released from prison, where they had been held for ‘anti-state’ 
activities: according to Lud, ‘the last clergyman walked out of the prison gates in July 1968’.96 
On 20 August 1968, the day before the Warsaw Pact invasion, all restrictive regulations on the 
teaching of religion were rescinded.97 As a result of these combined reforms, according to RFE, 
Catholic church activity ‘increased greatly, mainly as a result of the return of the bishops to their 
residences in Bohemia and Moravia’, together with the expansion of the Catholic press ‘the size 
and circulation of the papers and periodicals having practically doubled’ and the Faculty of 
Theology in Olomouc reopened.98  
When the KSČ Central Committee decided, on the fateful night of 20-21 August 1968, to 
protest rather than accede in the surprise ‘fraternal assistance’ provided by the incoming Warsaw 
Pact armies, Catholics joined their Czech and Slovak compatriots in supporting the position of 
the Dubček leadership and opposing the invaders.99 A few days later, when the Czechoslovak 
people were called upon by the Dubček leadership to stop protesting and accept the political 
realities spelled out in the Moscow Protocol, they obediently did so, presumably to avoid 
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violence and in the belief that this was the best way to keep what could be salvaged from the 
reform package. As Dr Erika Kadlecová, head of the Secretariat for Church Affairs, put it, 
‘Christians’ behaved during the August days that followed the Warsaw Pact intervention ‘exactly 
like all the other citizens, i.e. fantastically. They showed a high degree of civic conscience, 
courage and discipline; if anybody had doubts about their positive attitude to the socialist state, 
August must have proved to him that the very opposite was true’.100 
At first, the tactic advocated by the Dubček leadership and accepted by the population at 
large, appeared to be working. Members of the Dubček leadership were allowed to return to their 
posts. The Prague Spring reforms slowed – in a few cases reversed immediately – but did not 
grind to a complete halt. ‘Progress in the religious field’, according to Radio Free Europe, ‘did 
not end with the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops’, but the fact that the 
Catholics lost ‘their chief ideological base’, the Work of Council Revival, was an ominous 
sign.101 Eleven months later, on 26 July 1969, there was an even more worrying sign: Erika 
Kadlečová was dismissed as head of the Secretariat for Church Affairs at the Ministry of 
Culture.102 
On January 1970, Rudé právo, the Communist Party daily, ran a first, as yet only mildly, 
anticlerical story with the provocative title ‘An Uprising against the Pope?103 Over the course of 
the year, Church-State relations began rapidly to deteriorate and the press began to step up its 
anticlerical attacks. By September 1970, a propaganda display, reminiscent of the ‘Stalinist’ 
1950s, entitled ‘A Thwarted Attempt’, which included documents from the Vatican purporting to 
show that Czechoslovak Catholics had been involved in anti-state activities and in illegal contact 
with Catholic émigrés, was made public. Duchovní Pastýř, the Czech Catholic monthly brought 
out by the Catholic Caritas society, hastily declared that it would return to its ‘former traditions’, 
in other words, refrain from ‘touching on topical religious problems’ and refuse to allow Catholic 
laymen to write for the periodical.104 The pressure evidently continued, because the Czech 
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Catholic weekly Katolické noviny evidently felt obliged to publish, on 18 October 1970, a formal 
denial that it was ‘anti-state’ or maintaining illegal contacts with Czechoslovak émigrés 
abroad.105 Editors of the briefly reformist Catholic newspapers were nevertheless removed and 
replaced.106   
In August 1971, precisely three years after the Warsaw Pact intervention, the so-called 
‘ideological-professional associations of Catholic clergy’, cunningly named Pacem in Terris after 
the title of Pope John XXIII’s 1963 encyclical on nuclear non-proliferation, were simultaneously 
established in Prague and Bratislava by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Culture. In a policy 
statement, Miloslav Bružek, the Czech Minister of Culture, declared that the association would 
be ‘a voluntary societal and common-interest movement which will unite the Catholic clergy in 
Bohemia and Moravia’.107 The formation of Pacem in Terris, he further explained, ‘represents an 
important step in the relations of Church and State and, at the same time, proof of the successful 
consolidation of Czechoslovak society’ (Radio Prague, 31 August 1971).108  Pacem in Terris 
seemed to be intended, as an RFE analyst put it, ‘to take up the reins dropped by the former Peace 
Movement of Catholic Clergy’, originally set up in the ‘Stalinist’ 1950s and which had been 
‘completely compromised because of its servile procommunist line’ and therefore forced to cease 
operations in 1968.109 The peace priests were back. 
As dissident intellectuals Milan Simečka and Václav Havel observed, ‘Normalization’ in 
Czechoslovakia under the post-Dubček régime led by Gustáv Husák, another Slovak Communist, 
turned out to mean something more subtle and pernicious than the outright terror of the 1950s: 
although it had many of the same aims, its methods were more refined and its ends more cynical. 
This was a ‘civilized violence’,110 violence ‘with its ideological gloves on’, 111 whose aim was the 
consolidation of power for a Communist Party elite rather than a genuine, if brutal, attempt to 
bring about a socialist paradise. Pressure on believers outwardly to conform to the new political 
imperatives was steadily stepped up. In anticipation of the 1971 elections, for example, the 
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regime requested formal statements of support for the National Front from various religious 
organisations, including the Czechoslovak Hussite Church and the Czechoslovak Orthodox 
Church. The congregation of bishops (such as it was: there was only one bishop in Slovakia by 
this point)112 obediently issued pastoral letters expressing the ‘conviction that believers will 
support the internal and foreign policy of the country and, making use of their civic rights, will 
cast their votes for the candidates of the National Front’.113 
After religious periodicals and hierarchies were brought back into line, the next Prague 
Spring reforms to be undone were those concerning the religious education of the young. On 30 
July 1971, new instructions concerning religious education in schools were issued by the 
Ministry of Education and Culture (20 September 1971). ‘In essence’, an RFE analyst judged, 
these represented ‘a return to the situation that prevailed in the 1950s’. If parents, as RFE pointed 
out, ‘wish a child to attend religious instruction they must apply to the principal of the school’. 
On the other hand, ‘the ““political erudition”’ (i.e. Marxist-Leninist interpretation) demanded in 
the 1950s was ‘not required: the decree only makes it obligatory that teachers charged with 
giving religious education be “reliable citizens”’, an appellation which could not, of course, be 
tested in law.114 
Religious congregations were the next ‘problem’ to be dealt with by the regime. In 
November 1971, according to the Austrian press agency Kathpress, the Prague Office for Church 
Affairs informed the clergy that the November 1968 decree permitting the restoration of religious 
orders in the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republic was no longer valid. The monasteries and 
convents were again to be closed. Meanwhile, students of theology were required ‘to sign a 
declaration that they were not members of any order, that they had no intention of joining an 
order, and that they were not in touch with persons abroad’.115 The Prague regime simultaneously 
took ‘far-reaching measures’ to ‘prevent the importing of religious literature, especially 
publications in Czech issued by the Christian Academy in Rome (Academia Cristiana 
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Cecoslovacca)’, and broke off negotiations with the Vatican. Again according to Kathpress (9 
November 1971), it was planned to resume talks with the Vatican only once the state had ‘all 
religious life under strict supervision’.116 
By the end of 1971 and beginning of 1972, religious activity in the Czech-speaking lands 
of the Bohemian Crown (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, the territory of today’s Czech Republic) 
was legally constrained and kept under close supervision. It was only rarely interfered with 
obviously and directly, however, in a way that might galvanise protest. Rather, from what local 
RFE analysts could see, the ‘struggle against the Church’ was mainly ‘being waged on the 
ideological plane’, which took ‘the form of more extensive atheistic propaganda in schools and 
among young people generally’, for example through articles on ‘Scientific Atheism’ and ‘The 
Foundations of the Marxist-Leninist Views – Religion as a World Concept’ published in the 
professional teaching journals Učitelské noviny 1 (6 January 1972) and Vědy ve Škole 3 
(November 1971).117 Similarly, the theology faculties were not officially banned: but a rigorous 
numerous clausus, to keep the number of ordinands down, was introduced in both the Czech and 
Slovak socialist republics. 
In Slovakia, where the number of observant Catholics was much larger than in the 
Bohemian Crown Lands and the perceived threat to the regime substantially greater, the 
Bratislava seminary for priests was closed down on the pretext that the heating, which had not 
been functioning for over three years, suddenly needed urgently to be repaired.118 Some 33 
Slovak clergymen, mainly young, were refused, without explanation, to be allowed to take an 
active part in church administration. Several hundred priests were reassigned, often to remote 
districts, by the Bratislava Secretariat for Church Affairs at the Slovak Ministry of Culture.119 
According to the RFE analyst, ‘the administrative measures being taken against the Catholic 
Church in Slovakia’ had ‘to all intents and purposes put an end to the relative freedom won 
during the Dubček era.’ The present situation in regard to religion in Slovakia,’ the analyst 
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commented, ‘is reminiscent of that of the 1950s, though atheistic propaganda is carried out in a 
more intelligent manner and no longer follows the Soviet example blindly.’120 
By March 1972, the Catholic church in Czechoslovakia had reached what the Radio Free 
Europe considered to be ‘a critical situation’ since out of ten Czech and Slovak dioceses, ‘only 
Litoměřice [had] an incumbent bishop (Štěpán Trochta), while the two archdioceses of Prague 
and Olomouc [were] vacant, Bishop František Tomášek acting as administrator of the former.’121 
In May 1972, students at the seminary in Bratislava went on hunger strike to protest against the 
expulsion of seven of their fellow-students shortly before their ordination, at a time when 50 out 
of 80 students who applied to study for theology degrees were refused admission.122 Elementary 
school teachers, meanwhile, ‘began visiting the homes of their pupils and talking with their 
parents, and “by systematic agitation, persuaded some pupils to cancel their pending 
confirmation.”’123 Banksy claimed that the teachers had succeeded in influencing not only the 
pupils but also their parents.124 In such a context, when links with the Vatican were suspended, 
reformists purged, and the ‘Peace’ priests back in charge, it is not surprising that there was no 
more public discussion of HV in the Czech or Slovak religious press. Caution and self-censorship 
were logical responses in a climate in which expressing views that ran counter to the official line 
were almost certain to be reported to the authorities by undercover agents and informers and 
could to lead to trouble of all kinds, from petty inconveniences and difficulties, such as having a 
decent flat or being allowed to travel abroad, to more serious obstacles such as keeping one’s job 
or having one’s children be allowed to attend university. In extreme cases, dissent could lead to 
secret police monitoring and harrassment, and ultimately to prison or forced-labour sentences. 
 In Hungary, meanwhile, where an equivalent political crisis in domestic and international 
socialism had come and gone in 1956, the period of relative liberalism continued, uninterrupted, 
in 1968. 
 
 26 
Hungarian Population Policy in the 1960s and 1970s 
In Hungary, where there was a much more peaceful moment in State-Church relations than in 
contemporary Czechoslovakia, there was also considerably more discussion of Humanae Vitae. 
In Hungary the State did not need to undertake a similarly a direct and brutal intervention into 
Church affairs, because it mostly got the cooperation and understanding it wanted from Church 
dignitaries. If there was tension between Church and State, it lay hidden beneath the surface of 
‘Marxist-Christian‘ dialogue. For Hungary, instead of telling the story of post-1968 repression, it 
seems rather important to discuss how State policies vis-á-vis contraception changes. For, the 
issuing of the HV coincided with an era where the Hungarian State was concerned both with 
qualitative and quantitative change in population (more and better bred children) and reducing 
abortion numbers by propagating birth control. In this sense, at that time the cautious but critical 
line of the centrist-reformist Catholics from the Theology Academy - seemingly representing the 
only Catholic voice publicly - was highly convenient for the State, partly because it represented a 
split in the Church, but partly because it supported its population policy goals. Instead of 
underlining State-Church tension, providing a sketch of the contemporary Hungarian population 
policy aims and measure seems more relevant here. 
 
“By propagating and fostering the program of having children we need to aspire to 
make the methods of prevention known as widely as possible.  Its objective is to 
foster family planning but at the same time not reduce the number of births."125 
 
Dr András Kovács, a renowned gynecologist at the Budapest Medical University, and author of 
numerous books and articles on contraception and ‘women and mother protection’, penned the 
above sentences in 1973. In the same book he dedicated hundred of pages to publishing the most 
important documents relating to the 1973 ‘complex population policy decree’ which the socialist 
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State had determined in an aim to boost falling birthrates and put an end to the proliferation of 
abortion as a result of a liberal abortion decree from 1956. The working community of the Health 
Ministry recommended to the abortion committees that now had considerable power to decide if 
a woman had the right to terminate her pregnancy to primarily consider ‘beside the protection of 
the health of the mother and the unborn children their contribution to accomplishing the common 
goal of our whole society, establishing the three-child family type.’126 
The 1973 legislation included various economic measures: increased sums for maternity 
care, children's benefits and newborn's benefits. It also introduced mandatory premarital 
counseling where couples were to visit a doctor who then provided them with ‘appropriate advice 
and education on family planning’ and ‘if needed, they would be told about be told about the 
contraceptive methods suitable for them and provided with protective devices  – as stipulated by 
the law.‘127 Importantly, mandatory sex education ( under the euphemism ‘“education family 
life’”) was to be introduced at all three levels of education, where both biological-ethical 
knowledge on sexuality, as well as a push towards the ‘“three-child model’” was to be 
introduced. As, among others, János Tischler maintains, this decree constituted a watershed for 
the oral contraceptive pill, as well. What was originally introduced as Infecundin and produced 
locally in the Kőbánya (former Richter) factory as of 1967, remained largely unknown to most 
women for a number of years, mostly due to the muted press around it.128 The journalist Judit 
Kovács contended in 1969 that the pill in Hungary was not used widely because 'it was given bad 
publicity' as medical journals published instances when it was harmful to health and some doctors 
did not prescribe it 'out of conviction', resulting an estimations that only 20,000 women used oral 
contraceptives in 1968.129 By contrast, in 1969 there were 150,000 live births and 200,000 
abortions.130 From this it is clear that the main method of birth control for Hungarian women was 
terminating their pregnancy. 
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What is notable about the 1973 package is that it addressed the problem of population 
growth in a complex manner and, as such, the tendency of counter-correlation between the 
number of abortions and the number of live births soon turned into correlation (that is, both the 
number of abortions and of live births was in a constant decline as of 1975). The package 
introduced eight key policies that made it easier for large families to economize, ranging from 
increased amount maternity leave pay and up to 9 extra days of leave each year for mothers with 
children. As for contraceptive pills, before 1973 these could only be presubscribed to adults, by 
the gynecologist, who had the right to demand regular examinations131.[Ref] Distribution was 
also very limited, as in most cities they were sold in a single pharmacy as well as one pharmacy 
per district in Budapest.132 The population policy reforms made contraceptives available in most 
pharmacies, one could have it prescribed by any doctor – including one's GP – it was free,  and  
even 16-18 year olds could apply for it. 133  
Thus, in the years following HV, the population policy objectives of the Hungarian 
socialist State shifted considerably and one of the major outcomes of the new, ‘complex’ 
approach was the mass availability and the widespread promotion of oral contraceptives to large 
segments of the Hungarian population. It was clear by the mid-1970s that the State wanted 
couples to have more children, but if births were to be avoided, this should be achieved with the 
very method that HV forbade. In the next subsection a case study will be presented, which, shows 
how the Catholic debates around Humanae Vitae played a role in the struggle for the outlook of 
the Hungarian Catholic church, including the State’s opportunism in terms of its population 
policy goals. 
Case study: Szabolcs Vígh 
The story of Szabolcs Vígh works well as a case study to highlight the internal strife within the 
Catholic church with regard to birth control after HV. It can also to a certain extent put into 
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context the cooperation between church and State and the reach of the ‘“centrist revolution’” 
within the church.  
Szabolcs Vígh was among the group of theology students, who during the revolution of 
1956 participated in occupying and relocating the secret archive of the State Church Affairs 
Office and was therefore given a short prison sentence. He started his career as a local parish 
priest in 1958 and after serving various smaller towns he returned to Budapest in 1965.134 He had 
already worked out a sex education curriculum based on contemporary sexological work in his 
local parishes before he came to Budapest, and after 1968 he started a PhD at the Budapest 
Catholic Theology College on the church and the history of birth control.”135 He decided to 
pursue a PhD because as parish priest he was thinking about an acceptable regulation of birth 
control that remained true to the church. As he was dealing with confessions regularly, he also 
saw that Catholic couples ‘were in a difficult situation because of Casti Conubii.’136 It was 
theology professor Márk Kecskés, who suggested that he approach the issue of family planning 
from a historical perspective.  
His research led him to understand that the church had a constantly shifting opinion 
towards birth control historically and as such there was no such thing as the ‘eternal teaching of 
the Church.’137 His PhD supervisor and moral theology expert György Zemplén warned him to 
re-write certain more radical elements of the thesis in order to avoid dismissal as these ‘would not 
fit into Catholic theology’.138  He received his degree, however, with distinction in 1971 and, as 
an expert on birth control, was asked by various centrist theologians to contribute to the 
discussion of HV.139 Tamás Nyíri, who also worked for Vigília at the time, asked him to 
contribute to the Sexuality, Family, Society special issue in 1972. Subsequent to this, Szennay 
asked him to submit an article in Teológia in the special issue Christian Marriage and Family, 
while in 1974 he repeatedly published there on the practical question of Catholic confessions and 
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the issue birth control.140 Vígh maintains that his 1972 article was about to be published in 1970 
but the Catholic censor of Esztergom stopped its publication last minute – still, two years later it 
was given the go-ahead.141 
The early 1970s represented a peak both for centrist theology and for Vígh at least in 
terms of the public discourse on HV. Subsequently, Vígh found himself very quickly on the 
margins of the Hungarian Catholic church and this process, it seems, was done with the 
knowledge of the secret service, as they had been keeping him under close scrutiny. Szennay in 
1972 recommended him to be part of a group of young theologians in and around Teológia in 
order to create a modern Hungarian Catholic theology, but the secret police, through the State 
Church Office, was able to stop this process, which Vígh explains with the fact that he was seen 
as a hostile priest, most probably because of his 1956 activities.142 Soon afterwards, in Autumn 
1973 there was a clerical conference on birth control143 and Vígh both spoke at the meeting and 
submitted a written opinion upon request.144 Subsequently, he received a scolding reply from the 
bishop as his paper differed from Catholic teaching, which resulted in an exchange of several 
letters145.[ref] Vígh then requested a meeting with the bishop but was not received. Rather, he 
was moved to a new parish in July 1974. He decided to emigrate as his whole family was already 
in the Netherlands (they had left in 1956) and in 1976 he left the Catholic church. According to 
his explanation, the bishop's reaction 'was due to the fact that I was not fooled, I did not join the 
(pro-Communist – G.Sz.) peace priests, they were unable to make a secret agent out of me and at 
the same time I was a progressive voice among the priests. Also, I started a church religious 
study program in 1971, to have topics ready for the Sunday student masses. Because of these I 
had a certain reputation and the timid and closed church leaders didn't like it.’146 In the oral 
history interview Vígh mentions another case, one from 1976, that of László Pauka. Pauka was 
doing a great deal of work among young people and as a consequence received similar treatment: 
 31 
being moved from one parish to another and not getting a hearing from the archbishop. At this 
time the State Church Office was clearly putting pressure on the bishops to control those priests 
who were close to the young and were trying to build up [base] communities.147 
As for Vígh's position, it was not significantly different from what appeared in Vigília 
after 1968, and was consistent with the Doromby-Nyíri-Szennay line. He also emphasized that 
marital love was on a equal footing with procreation according to the encyclical and that 
therefore contraception was ‘certainly the lesser evil’ if love would suffer and cause damage in 
the family. He concurred that being ‘selfish’ and using contraception for comfort was morally 
unjustifiable but that it was ‘the believer, who was in the existential situation’ that had to make 
the decision because they were responsible for their decision before God.148 In his 1972 Teológia 
article, he highlighted the same point from an historical and scriptural angle. He wrote that 
whereas the Bible does not write explicitly about birth control149 it laid emphasis both in the Old 
and New Testaments on marital love and satisfaction. His overview of how birth control was seen 
within the Catholic church underlined how change occurred and therefore, just as Szennay, he 
emphasized that the Pope's encyclical was ‘fallible’ and that it rather was a good sign that further 
research was needed on birth control. Importantly, Vígh in his 1974 ‘“The Problems of Family 
Planning in the Confessional Practice’” put in a word for treating believers as adults and full 
equals, so that in the confessional the priest should to give them information to think and decide 
for themselves. He explicitly stated: ‘they need to be told that there are contradictory 
prescriptions within the Church and the prohibition of birth control is of a kind, from which one 
can deviate in certain, individual situations.’150 
The case of birth control, and specifically that of Szabolcs Vígh, seems useful for pointing 
to the limits of a ‘centrist’ line in Hungarian Catholicism in the Kádár era. The State Church 
Affairs Office, admittedly, supported a moderate theology that was pursued by Szennay, Nyíri 
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and Gál, which took into account the realities of the Church within a Socalist state and sought to 
reach out to atheists and Marxists. However, once voices within the Church appeared to be too 
progressive and possibly too popular among the young, there was a need to intervene. In the case 
of contraception, there seems to have been a temporary alliance between the Interior Ministry and 
the more conservative church leadership, who were keen on a correction of the initial line of 
Vigília and Teológia. The articles of these two notable Catholic periodicals in the early 1970s 
showed a critical tone towards HV’s approach to contraception and indicated a mini-revolution 
favoring the emancipation of Catholic families in decision-making regarding procreation. This 
stretched the boundaries of the higher echelons of the Hungarian Catholic church as they were 
not ready for such a direct criticism of the Pope and such a jump in individual adjudication in the 
field of sexual ethics with regard to theorizing over contraception. At the same time the State 
Church Affairs Office – even if Vígh or Szennay were in line with the contemporary, Marxist 
‘our child is a wanted child’ policy – probably wanted a less emancipatory church that would be 
distant from its followers, especially young people both in theory and practice. 
Czechoslovak population policy and contraception 
In Czechoslovakia, the background to population control was a little different than in 
Hungary since there was a long interwar tradition of Czech anarchist and Communist (as 
well as German Social Democrat) parliamentarians proposing abortion laws in the 
Czechoslovak Parliament, none of which, however, were successfully passed during the 
First Czechoslovak  First Czechoslovak Republic (1918/of 1920-1938).151 It was not until 
1957, a couple of years after abortion had been legalized in the Soviet Union, to 
considerable protest from the Catholic church, that abortion was made legal in the then 
Czechoslovak people’s democracy. As in HungarylAs in Hungary, the KSČ leadership 
evidently came to see the best way simultaneously to control population growth and to 
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avoid unnecessary abortions would be to develop, adopt or spread artificial anticonception 
methods. The first Czechoslovak anti-conception drugs, Depo-Provera (which was 
injected) and Antigest (which was taken orally) were developed in 1963 and 1965 
respectively, just as the baby-boomer generation was coming of age.  The first so-called 
‘mini-Pill’, Nacenyl, was released in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the same year as the 
encyclical HV, and a little after the release of Infecundin in neighbouring Hungary.152 
In January 1968, after Alexander Dubček had replaced Antonín Novotný as First 
Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, but before the new KSČ leadership had 
launched its socialist reforms or the Vatican had published HV, Duchovní Pastýř, the 
official Catholic newspaper of the Communist-controlled Caritas movement in 
Czechoslovakia, brought out what purported to be a think-piece on ‘The Second Vatican 
Council on Marriage and the Family’.153 Despite its promising title, the article, although 
presented in a friendly tone and written by a qualified theologian, offered little more than 
vaguely humanistic and socialist clichés without actually saying anything of significance 
about the discussions on the family taking place in the church. Jaroslav Michal, an expert 
on canon and family law, informed Duchovní Pastýř’s Catholic readership, in tones 
reminiscent of the Communist Party jargon of the day, that ‘today’s problems concerning 
marriage and the family’ were ‘neither new not surprising’ and were of importance to ‘the 
whole of human society’.154 Praising the Second Vatican Council for raising the important 
question of marriage and the family, it stressed that ‘the question of marriage and the 
family is not simply a theological question’ because it is a ‘question that touches the whole 
of humanity’.155 The essentially secular, pro-regime premises and tautological logic of the 
article were clear: the Pope, the Vatican and the church ought to be ‘progressive’ in all 
things because it was always right everywhere and in all things to be ‘progressive’.  
However ‘good’ the Vatican’s ‘intentions’ might be in raising the question of marriage and 
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the family, Michal argued, the church should always bear in mind that the most important 
thing was to place such questions in the ‘wider’ and more ‘significant’ contexts of the 
‘prosperity of the people’, the enrichment of  ‘the land’ and the promotion of ‘world 
peace’.156 According to the well-known signifiers of the day, what this expert theologian’s 
assessment conveyed to its readers was that the Catholic church should be measured by 
material, humanistic and secular standards as espoused by the KSČ, the National Front, the 
Peace Priests and all other approved organisations in the de facto one-party authoritarian 
state. Canon law, earlier encylicals, and traditionally Catholic spiritual, moral or theological 
teaching were not alluded to, let alone discussed in print, even by a man who had dedicated 
his life to the study of family life, been awarded a doctorate for a thesis on ‘Natural and 
Sacred Marriage Law’ (Manželství práva přirozeného a svátostné; 1956; degree awarded in 
1960)157 and published theological works relevant to the discussion.158 
During the brief lapse in Party control brought about by the removal of pre-
publication censorship as part of the Prague Spring reforms of April-August 1968, it was 
suddenly possible to speak, and even publish, more freely. The first article to appear in the 
press on the subject of conception and abortion, about a week before HV was published, 
gave an uncompromisingly conservative Catholic view. This article, published in the Czech 
version of Katolické noviny by a ‘Catholic doctor’, took an ‘entirely negative’ stance to the 
existing Czechoslovak (1957) abortion law, arguing that the church was ‘entirely logical’ in 
its argument that ‘all living things come from living things’ with the inference that the 
interruption of a pregnancy, at any stage, represented an ‘interruption’ of God’s plan.159 
This appears to have been the only overtly conservative Catholic article published, at least 
legally and publically, in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
The first direct mention, by name, of HV in the Catholic press in Czechoslovakia 
came, on 11 August 1968, in the form of a brief news report on the ‘Encyclical on Birth 
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Control’.160 This time, the article was buried away on page three in the Slovak-only version 
of the Catholic newspaper Katolícke noviny .[sic].161 The paragraph did little more than to 
state that an encyclical on the subject of birth control, opening with words ‘Humanae 
Vitae’, had been published ‘in the last few days’ (in fact nearly three weeks earlier); that it 
consisted of three parts; that it was not an infallible or dogmatic ex cathedra statement; that 
every believer was free to follow his or her own conscience in the matter; but that the 
church, in line with its earlier teachings, did not approve the use of anticonception drugs, 
sterilization (whether short-term or permanent) or the interruption of pregnancy, including 
by means of ‘therapeutic’ abortion.162 The tone of the article was studiously neutral. It did 
not invite comment or discussion. Nor did it publish the full text of the encyclical, so that 
Catholic readers might be in a position to consider the arguments for themselves.  
On 18 August 1968, just a couple of days before the arrival of the five Warsaw Pact 
armies, the Czech Catholic press followed with the first in a three-part article on ‘the gift of 
life’ by Oto Mádr, a victim in the 1950s show trials who had been recently been 
rehabilitated and therefore had excellent ‘Prague Spring’ credentials. Mádr’s views are 
especially significant since he was working closely with František Tomášek, the only 
Czechoslovak bishop permitted to attend the Second Vatican Council.163  The article, 
whose opening section appeared on the front cover of the Czech-language edition of 
Katolické noviny, gave a relatively balanced summary of both conservative and liberal 
Catholic positions with regard to the encyclical, but made clear its own ‘liberal’ position.  It 
explained that the encyclical had been prompted by concern over the current population 
explosion together with the recent development and spread of artificial means of birth 
control. It expressed surprise that the papacy felt it to be within its remit to pronounce on 
such an ‘intimate’ question as birth control and disappointment that it took such a 
conservative and hard-line view, ignoring the majority of theologically respectable opinions 
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that ran counter to his own.164 Although clearly placing himself on the liberal Catholic, and 
simultaneously more régime-friendly side of the debate, Mádr seems to write sincerely, as a 
Christian rather than a Communist stooge, and sympathized with the Pope’s ‘heaviness of 
heart’ in reaching a decision that was ‘difficult’ and that he knew would be unwelcome by a 
majority of Catholics.165 He concluded with the conciliatory view that neither ‘the Christian 
life’ nor ‘human progress’ had ever ‘advanced’ without some element of ‘sacrifice’ and 
finished with the disclaimer that ‘this was roughly how, at a first reading’ he ‘understood 
the Encyclical Humanae Vitae’.166 Mádr, although implicitly supporting the Communist 
régime’s view that birth control was to be welcomed, nevertheless sought to present the 
Pope’s arguments fairly, repeating his stated concerns that, by interfering with the 
possibility of conception, ‘men might lose respect for women’ and that, according to the 
papacy, ‘married couples were responsible not only to themselves, but also to God, their 
families, and society.’167 They should, the encyclical stressed and Mádr faithfully reported, 
remain ‘open to the gift of life’ and remember that human beings do not have ‘unlimited 
rights’ to their own bodies.168  
By 22 September 1968, when the third and final portion of Mádr’s reflections on the 
encyclical were published in Katolické noviny, Mádr came across as markedly less 
accommodating and was perhaps showing signs of interference from the editor or pressure 
from the secret police. This time, instead of sympathizing with the papacy, he put forward 
the Pope’s ‘own acknowledgement’ that HV was ‘controversial’ (a word which, in Czech, 
carries exclusively negative connotations). He further commented waspishly on how 
‘interesting’ it was that the main religious bodies in agreement with the Vatican on the 
question of birth control were the orthodox Jews, Muslims and orthodox Christians (none 
of whom had a good reputation in traditional Czechoslovak Catholic circles). The Church 
of England, he pointed out, although ‘sympathetic’ to the conservative Catholic position, 
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judged the matter best left to parental conscience. Doctors, philosophers and politicians, 
Mádr further noted pointedly, had yet to pronounce on the matter.169 As if all this were not 
enough, Mádr – although, even now, his readers did not have access to the actual text of the 
encyclical in Czech or in Slovak - quoted at length from the objections to HV set out by the 
Viennese Cardinal Franz König,170 as explored in more depth in Ebner and Mesner’s 
chapter within this volume. 
On the same day that the Czech Catholic press brought out the first of Oto Mádr’s 
reports, the Slovak Catholic press published two articles on the topic: one by Dr Cyril 
Dudáš, on ‘The Encyclical on population control’ and another, by Dr Ján Gunčaga, on the 
‘The living source of the Catholic family’.171 Dr Cyril Dudáš reported simply that Paul VI 
had forbidden the use of Antigest (the ‘Catholic pill’) and that ‘those who had hoped’ that 
the Pope would permit ‘modern people’ to use birth control would be disappointed. Instead, 
as the article pointed out, the Pope affirmed the earlier teaching of Pius XI that allowed the 
Ogino-Knaus (rhythm) method as the only means of controlling fertility, thus giving a 
‘negative’ response to those who had hoped for a ‘compromise’. The article, although 
taking care not to contradict the Pope directly, nevertheless made it clear that it disapproved 
of the encyclical, and laid stress on the fact that the Anglican Church took a different view 
of artificial birth control,172 as Harris’ chapter expounds. Gunčaga’s article, presumably 
heavily edited, made little sense, beyond insisting, without clear context, that a Christian’s 
life consisted not only of his or her physical body, but also an interior spiritual life which 
was ‘nourished’ through ‘prayer, spiritual exercises and spiritual renewal.’173 The article, 
although evidently theologically Catholic in intention, did not put forward a coherent, 
sustained argument. 
In January 1969, five months after the return of press censorship and as the 
Normalization régime began to crack down on the church in earnest, Rudé právo, the 
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Communist Party daily, began its negative campaign to discredit the Vatican. This began 
with a subtle piece, simply noting Dutch Catholic opposition to HV.174  Within a few days, 
its stance had become more aggressive, with articles in both Rudé právo (the KSČ’s official 
mouthpiece and the newspaper with the largest circulation in the country) and Pochodeň 
with lurid titles featuring the words ‘the Vatican’ ‘the Pill’ and ‘Money’, casting aspersions 
on the papacy and repeating anticlerical Italian reports that a Jesuit from the papal 
commission responsible for HV had been taking bribes.175 
It was not until some seventeen years later, in 1986, that the existing (1957) 
Czechoslovak abortion law, which had made provision for terminations of pregnancy only 
with medical permission, was amended to allow for abortion ‘on demand’ up to 12 weeks 
of pregnancy.176 Cardinal Tomášek, by then a more independent figure,177 publically 
opposed the new abortion law. A petition protesting ‘abortion on demand’ managed to 
gather 15,000 signatures,178 an entirely exceptional number, and a sign of growing Catholic 
opposition to a regime as yet untouched by perestroika, known in Czech as přestavba, but 
partially aware of the quiet revolutions taking place in Catholic Poland and Hungary.  In 
December 1987, Augustin Navrátil’s 31-point petition, whose primary demand was for ‘the 
separation of the church from the state so that the state would not interfere in the church’s 
organization and activities’ began to circulate.179  By May 1988, more than half a million 
people, mainly Catholics, had signed it. The petition, which demanded an end to the 
jamming of Vatican radio, unhindered access to religious literature, freedom of religious 
assembly, the full restoration of religious orders, hierarchies and theological faculties, the 
decriminalization of samzidat literature and much else besides, made no reference to 
abortion or, indeed, to sexual and social matters of any kind.180 
After the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia was overturned, in 1989-1990, 
some criticism of the 1986 Czechoslovak abortion law and its premises was published.  But 
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it is noteworthy that the only pamphlets to be found in the formerly Czechoslovak (now 
Czech) National Library were translations from articles by Polish priests or religious rather 
than native productions. Nor does any notable ‘pro-Life’ lobby or protest movement appear 
to have followed the ‘fall’ of the Communist regime.181 The same 1986 abortion law 
remains in force, unchallenged, in both the Czech and Slovak republics to the present day 
(2017), suggesting continuity in attitudes.  Birth control is legal and readily available in 
both states, although it has been pointed out by Women’s Rights groups around the world 
that although contraception is subsidized, and therefore made universally available, in the 
Czech Republic, it is not subsidized by the state in Slovakia, meaning that it is nevertheless 
harder to have an abortion in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. 
 
Conclusion 
An examination of reactions to HV in two neighbouring socialist states – Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary – points to a number of conclusions. Research into the topic of public 
reactions to the 1968 encyclical underlines the importance of Communist Party leaderships 
in the Warsaw Pact countries in enabling, encouraging, restraining or otherwise shaping 
public debate on the topic of birth control. During liberal phases, such as the Prague Spring 
in Czechoslovakia, when censorship was lifted and free expression encouraged, or the late 
1960s – early 1970s in Hungary, opposing points of view could be heard and compromise 
positions reached. At other times, when the state considered civil society to be threatening 
to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, Catholic newspapers toed the line and either kept silent or 
else echoed Party directives.  
In Hungary, HV was carefully rejected as an anachronism by centrist theologians, 
who wanted to modernize the church from within, but by the mid-1970s church 
conservatives silenced these voices, which – even though it clearly contradicted its official 
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population policy goals - was also in the interest of a State that did not want a grassroots 
revolution in an otherwise feudal and highly hierarchical instiution. In Czechoslovakia, HV 
was useful as one more propaganda item with which to seek to discredit the Vatican in 
order to better undermine and control the Catholic church. Even so, the new abortion law of 
1986, passed at a time when external pressure to liberalise was just beginning to be felt by 
the KSČ, sparked some protest. 
 In both socialist states, the general pattern of state attitudes to birth control was 
similar.  Both promoted ‘the Pill’ as a means of controlling population growth (in 
preference to abortion) in the 1960s (the pill was introduced by the Communist regime in 
Hungary in 1967 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968); and both ignored conservative Catholic 
scruples or protests. Abortion regulations, however, diverged. In Hungary, on demand 
abortion was introduced in 1956 and this liberal approach was then somewhat curbed by the 
1973 population policy decree and the introduction of abortion committees. Access to 
abortions was liberalized after the regime change in 1992. By contrast, in Czechoslovakia 
abortion committees were in place from 1957 to 1986. The 1986 Czechoslovak abortion 
law still stands in both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Meanwhile, use of the 
pill and other forms of artificial birth control, although available in all three states, can still 
be influenced by the presence, absence or level of state subsidy. 
 There was a broad similiarity in the experience of Catholicism in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, and indeed, society as a whole, in the immediate post-war years and so-
called ‘Stalinist’ 1950s, with the notable exception of the Hungarian events of 1956.  The 
late 1940s and first half of the 1950s was the period when both states were actively seeking 
to control and dominate the Church. Liberalization occurred, in both states, in the 1960s, 
although the Czechoslovak disaster in 1968 meant that Hungary continued in a more liberal 
direction than its neighbor throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  Liberal Centrists in Hungary, 
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like the few lone voices to speak out in Czechoslovakia, were cautiously critical of the 
encyclical, citing the criticisms put forward by German and Austrian bishops rather than 
courting direct controversy.  Catholics in both countries were constrained not only by 
internal disagreements over questions of morality and theology and broader divisions 
within the universal church but, more obviously and directly, by the risks of subversion, 
betrayal or collusion with a fundamentally antagonistic, manipulative and watchful regime 
at home. 
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